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
RCS: ECIS-5

UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
ANNUAL HISTORICAL REPORT
FOR THE
US EUROPEAN COMMAND AND THE JCS
1 JANUARY - 31 DECEMBER 1962

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Prepared by the Historical Division, Office of Information
Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe
APO 633, New York, New York 20 February 1963

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Portions declassified IAW reviews conducted by
HQ USAFE/DO Ltr, 28 Oct 88, "Freedom of Infor-
mation Request, Case Number 88-071."
HQ USAFE/XP Ltrs, 8 Dec 88, "Same subj" and
5 Jan 89, "Same subj."
CINCUSAFE/CS SSS, 4 Jan 89, "Same subj."


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out by a MAP team stationed at Rabat under the cover designation of the Moroccan US Liaison Office (MUSLO). On 30 June, the last two USAF aircraft control and warning (AC&W) units in Morocco⁵⁶ were discontinued.

B. SOVIET THREATS TO BERLIN AIR ACCESS

1. Harassment of Air Corridor Traffic


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AIR CORRIDORS TO BERLIN
During the Airlift

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Fig 6



On all of these occasions, the three Western controllers in the BASC reminded the Soviet element that Soviet aircraft flying along or across the corridors would have to abide by the agreed four-power rules for such flights, i. e., file flight plans with the BASC for flights in the corridors and comply with the agreed quadripartite rules for corridor crossings. The Soviet representatives were warned that Western military and commercial flights in the corridors would proceed as usual. The Soviet implication that when Russian aircraft were flying in the corridors between certain altitudes, American, British and French aircraft could not be guaranteed safety of flight was rejected.

Western airlines flew all of their scheduled flights in and out of Berlin at the normal operating altitudes of 8,000 to 9,000 feet and the Western Allies flew more than double the usual number of military flights in the corridors at all altitudes on 8 February and 9 February during the periods of exclusive use demanded by the Russians, without incident.⁵⁹ The USAF made 18 passenger and transport flights in the corridors below the 7,000 feet "reserved"

altitudes on 8 February and the morning of 9 February. General Lucius D. Clay (Ret.), the President's personal representative in Berlin was flown to Bremen in West Germany along the northern corridor Berlin-Hamburg at 6,000 feet by the USAF on the 9th without sighting Soviet air activity. However, Allied military pilots reported seeing some Soviet military aircraft during one of the periods the Russians had attempted to reserve.

On 14 February, Soviet fighter aircraft on two occasions bussed an RAF Pembroke aircraft enroute to Berlin with the British Ambassador to West Germany as a passenger. British military sources reported the planes had made a dangerously close pass about 500 feet from the transport. That same day, two USAF transport planes proceeding to Berlin via the north corridor were closely approached by Soviet aircraft three times.

During the morning of 15 February, several United States civil and military aircraft flying in the south corridor were harassed by Soviet fighter aircraft. On one occasion the fighters came within 20 feet of a C-124 and made gestures indicating the

pilot should land, but the Globemaster pilot remained on course. News media subsequently reported that one Soviet fighter pilot had lowered his landing gear, indicating the G-124 should land, and requested radio permission from his commander to fire a burst to enforce this order.⁶¹ The Globemaster aircrew was subsequently cited and received a personal letter from the President for their conduct in this incident.⁶²

Also on 15 February, the Soviet controller in the BASC refused to guarantee safety of flight for a French military aircraft which had filed a flight plan via the south corridor during the period of the Soviet exercise announced for that day.⁶³ The Soviet official stated that if the aircraft took off it would be turned back. Contacted through his JACK PINE command post, General Norstad directed the French plane to take off immediately and the flight proceeded without incident.

The Soviet Union was warned in identical protest notes from the three Western Powers on 15 February that it was "running grave risks" in its Berlin air corridor harassment.⁶⁴ They held the Soviet government "responsible for the consequences of any incidents which might occur." United States authorities announced that "certain military contingency plans" had been put into effect to safeguard Allied aircraft flying the Berlin air corridors. Although Russian jets had swept out of the corridors and directly over West Berlin, the Communists called the Western charges "purest fiction."

Additional flight plans on Soviet aircraft were passed to the Western Allied elements in the BASC on February 20th, 21st, 26th, 27th and 28th for Soviet flights in the three air corridors. These plans were always made available one day in advance of the flights. There were no reported incidents of aircraft harassment in February after the Russians began filing flight plans.

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There were three instances of Soviet aircraft approaching Western Power flights closely enough to call for oral protest by Allied element controllers in March. On 7 March, two Soviet jet aircraft harassed a Royal Air Force Pembroke. The Soviet jets made several runs and breaks in front of the British aircraft, flew alongside, and orbited around it, coming within 100 yards. A USAF C-130 flying in the south corridor on 22 March was approached by two Soviet jet fighters which passed from left to right at less than 100 feet distance. The pilot of a British European Airways Viscount aircraft on 30 March reported a Communist fighter passing below his aircraft from left to right in six-eighths cloud layer conditions and poor visibility.

(u) (S) Also during March, the Soviets showered metallic chaff on the western approaches to Berlin for several hours on two different days in an apparent attempt to interfere with Western Power radar reception and air corridor traffic control.

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United States and Great Britain lodged vigorous protests against this tactic. At his 14 March press conference, the President called the Soviet chaff dropping a "particularly dangerous kind of action." 69

There were two other Berlin air corridor operation "firsts" in March 1962. The Russians flew in the corridors at night for the first time toward the middle of the month. On 10 and 11 March, the

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USAF flew the first two C-133 Cargomasters into Berlin. The Cargomaster could haul up to 25 tons of cargo, about three times as much as a C-124.

The Soviets suddenly ceased the overt harassment of Western air traffic to Berlin on 29 March—at least insofar as registered flights were concerned.⁷⁰ However, unregistered Soviet jet fighter flights in the corridors, always heavier in the maneuver months of March and April, increased to an unprecedented degree during April 1962. Up to that time, Soviet fighter activity in the corridors even during Soviet maneuvers had been sparse enough to permit the issuance of radio warnings on an individual basis by the Berlin air traffic center, but in April the center began sending blanket warnings on the presence of Soviet aircraft in the corridors to all Western flights. On 11 April, for instance, all Western pilots concerned were informed that: "we have very heavy unidentified jet activity in the south corridor."

Soviet harassment of Western Power flights during the first half of 1962 did not succeed in reducing the air traffic to Berlin. The volume of air passenger traffic to and from Berlin for February increased 18.4 percent over the same month in 1961, despite the absence of the East Zone refugees who had once made up a large part of Berlin's outbound traffic. Helped by a West Germany subsidy of reduced fares, Pan American World Airways traffic increased 31 percent over the previous year in the first four months of 1962.⁷³ Pan American flew a record 91 flights in one day between West Berlin and eight cities of West Germany during May.

The grand totals of the corridor and local flights cleared by the BASC in the first six months of 1962 were:

<u>January</u>	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>
-	3,043	3,360	3,830	4,161	4,269

2. Berlin Air Safety Center Operations

Initially, the Soviets heightened the tension on 15 February by issuing an angry warning to the Allied elements in the BASC that the Western Powers would be responsible for incidents that might occur if the Russian demands for exclusive use of lower flight levels in the corridors were ignored. Soviet controllers reiterated this theme constantly in the following months. The tone and conduct of the Soviet element during February and March contrasted with previous periods of workmanlike proceedings in the center and a much friendlier attitude again in May and June.

On 15 February also, the Soviet Element presented demands to the Allied elements that: (a) plans for all Western flights should be given the preceding evening with an indication of the estimated time of crossing the German Democratic Republic (GDR) border; (b) actual GDR border crossing times be given in due course, and (c) established flight levels for corridor flights be strictly maintained. Upon Allied rejection of these demands, the Soviets began writing on the flight plans filed by Western aircraft for south corridor flights: "Without border estimate, safety of flight not guaranteed." The American duty controller in the BASC routinely replied that the aircraft in question was an Allied airplane and his government held the Soviet government responsible for its safety of flight.

During the second half of February, most of the Soviet controllers actively nit-picked and harassed the Western controllers when an opportunity presented itself. They made excessive demands

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For information whenever they noted Allied elements were exceptionally busy. In the following months, the Soviet element continually demanded changes in Western flight plans to avoid alleged conflicts with Soviet aircraft flying in the corridors. The Russians also actively campaigned against Western Allied round robin flights in the corridors, and they endorsed Western Power flight plans for the local area with the statement: "Over West Berlin only." All of these attempts to exercise control over Allied traffic to Berlin were rejected by the Western Powers, although not always uniformly.

3. The Significance

(u) (s) The Soviet demands for exclusive use of Berlin corridor air space in this period had, of course, no mere legal validity than the earlier Russian attempts to place a 10,000 foot ceiling on the corridors. ⁷⁵ It was only in 1958, after 13 years of Western Allied precedent for flying above 10,000 feet in the corridors on occasion as the weather or operational factors required, that Soviet objections took the form of threats and refusals to guarantee flight safety. Thereafter, Allied high altitude flights in the corridors were invariably intercepted by Soviet fighters. Nevertheless, it was Allied policy in the first half of 1962 to publicly minimize the new Soviet harassment tactics, although alert newsmen made this difficult. ⁷⁶ The United States policy intent was not to give the Berliners the impression that the Soviet harassment tactics were following an upward curve despite all the Western Powers could do.

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Whether legal or not, the Russian tactics in the spring of 1962 were a further phase of the relentless Communist campaign to gradually circumscribe and finally choke-off the West's crucial air access to Berlin.⁷⁷ The Soviets had flown in the air corridors since the end of the Second World War, but by placing a larger number of aircraft in this limited airspace without BASC control they were in effect searching out the limits of the situation and defining it.⁷⁸ They were underlining the point that these airplanes were not exclusively for Western use; a fact which might be of considerable importance to any future Allied airlift to Berlin. Nevertheless, some observers felt in this period that there were signs of a possible Soviet accommodation on the Berlin issue.

Others believed that the constant Soviet probing and piecemeal encroachment over the years had gained considerable success in allowing them to make their own definition of the Allied commitment to Berlin.⁷⁹ In 1955, when the Soviets transferred control over civilian traffic on the land route to Berlin to the East Germans, the Allies allowed the move to go uncontested. When the Soviets threatened in 1958 to extend East German control to include allied military traffic, the United States formed the "agent" theory, whereby GDR controlling officials would be regarded as Soviet agents. Construction of the "wall" dividing Berlin in August 1961 at one blow reduced the Four Power Statute to a few vestiges. After the wall, the Allies announced that they were responsible for their respective sectors of the city and access thereto — nothing more.

It was in the light of this cumulative process that Berliners inevitably regarded Soviet harassment of the Allied air corridors. They questioned whether the United States plan for internationalization of the access routes originally presented by US Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow was not responsible for the Soviet air corridor harassment of 1962, since the plan indicated a willingness to make concessions on the hitherto "immutable right" of access to Berlin.

FOOTNOTES

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32. Hists Hq USAFE DCS/Ops, Command Post, and Dir Ops Svs, Air Transp Div, Jul-Dec 62, pp. 2,8. SECRET. Information used is Unclassified.
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CHAPTER V
MANEUVERS AND EXERCISES

A. FIRST HALF 1962

The main NATO exercises held during the first half of 1962 were LONG THRUST II and III, and GRAND SLAM. The latter was in the exercise schedule for the year. LONG THRUST II, a short notice exercise, was the first of a series in a United States Strike Command (USSTRICOM) program, and the first of this kind in which USAFE participated.

1. LONG THRUST EXERCISES

The new operations plan differed in some respects from that for the exercise cancelled in May 1961. Three battle groups of the 4th Division, US Army, instead of a three-battle-group task force from the 101st Airborne Division were to be deployed to the Allied Command Europe (ACE) area. Also, USAFE instead of TAC would provide tactical air participation in the maneuver phase of the exercise.

LONG THRUST II was the first exercise in which US Army troops were airlifted from the Continental United States (CONUS) to Germany since World War II, and the first in which organisational equipment stockpiled in Europe was used. The stockpile included tracked and wheeled vehicles and heavy equipment.

The exercise consisted of three phases: Phase I, deployment;
 Phase II, tactical exercise; and Phase III, redeployment.⁶ In
 Phase I MATS airlifted the three fully armed battle groups (approx-
 imately 5485 persons) and 164 tons of cargo from McChord Air Force
 Base, near Tacoma in the State of Washington, to Rhein Main Air Base.
 The battle groups deployed were the 1st of the 22nd Infantry, the 2nd
 of the 39th Infantry, and the 2nd of the 47th Infantry. Their
 permanent station was Fort Lewis, also near Tacoma.

The MATS aircraft began to arrive at Rhein Main on 16 January.
 By 21 January two of the battle groups already had moved on to the
 Mannheim staging area and the third group soon arrived there.⁷ The
 deployment was supposed to require 97 sorties with an arrival rate
 of 1.1 aircraft per hour at Rhein Main.

Phase III was the airlift redeployment of the 1st Battle Group
 of the 22nd Infantry to the CONUS. One of the others remained for
 additional training in the area and the third was stationed tempo-
 rarily at Augsburg.⁸ For this reason the redeployment required
 less support from USAFE than did deployment. Redeployment was
 completed on 15 February.⁹

The Seventeenth Air Force was tasked for major support and
 tactical commitments in all three phases of the exercise through
 both national and NATO channels.¹⁰ During Phases I and III the
 Seventeenth was responsible for operating a USCINCEUR air terminal
 facility at Rhein Main, the furnishing of base and logistical
 support as required by MATS and USAREUR, the provision of a guest
 observer bureau, and making available medical support to Army and

USAF personnel staging through the base.¹¹ The Seventeenth augmented the 7310th Air Base Wing with personnel from command resources: 161 to assist with deployment, and 112 for the re-deployment.

This command's tactical fighter and reconnaissance wings and tactical wings (STAIR STEP) were required to be prepared to provide a number of sorties daily throughout the exercise. The units and

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daily requirements were as follows:

<u>Units</u>	<u>Sorties and Type</u>
10 Tac Rec Wg	1 night recon
66 Tac Tec Wg	6 recon
7117 Tac Wg	6 day recon
36 Tac Ftr Wg	8 tac close air support
50 Tac Ftr Wg	12 tac close air support
102 Tac Ftr Wg	20 tac close air support
7131 Tac Wg	10 tac close air support
7108 and 7121 Tac Wgs	20 tac close air support

The newly positioned 152nd Tactical Control Group gained initial experience in executing control procedures. LONG THRUST was the first full-scale exercise in which this organization acted as the primary radar controlling agency.

In Phase II there had been difficulties associated primarily with the radar and communications ground support of exercise aircraft. There

had been no major problems which had jeopardized the accomplishment of exercise objectives.

2. LONG THRUST III

The mission of USAFE's Seventeenth Air Force in LONG THRUST III was the support of the deployment and redeployment off-loading and on-loading at Rhein Main Air Base, or at Sembach or Ramstein Air Bases if either of these were used as an alternate base. A total of 2000 troops and 150 tons were off-loaded. There being no maneuvers and no guest observer bureau, the unit tasked in this project was the 7310th Air Base Wing at Rhein Main.

On 28 May Headquarters Seventeenth Air Force reported to USAFE that no major problem had attended the execution of LONG THRUST III. ²⁰

However, the official flow schedule had been received too late to change planned requirements based upon informal information. In emphasising the necessity for early receipt of flow schedules, this headquarters recommended that a standard LONG THRUST document be prepared to provide for these exercises, thereby requiring a minimum relay of information for each exercise.

On 11 June 1962 the Seventh US Army published an operation plan²¹ for implementation of a USSTRICOM operation plan. This plan, dated 19 April, set up a program of recurrent LONG THRUST operations. At approximately 90-day intervals, USAREUR would participate in a JCS-directed and NATO-sponsored LONG THRUST mobility exercise. The purpose of the operation plan was to provide for the orderly rotation of United States forces available for SACEUR Strategic Reserves and those temporarily stationed in the ACE Central Region.

USAFE on 15 June issued Operation Plan 152-62 which tasked the Seventeenth Air Force for only the provision of base support as required at the alternate arrival and departure airfields if used in a LONG THRUST exercise.²² This plan reflected the assignment of Rhein Main Air Base from the Seventeenth Air Force to the 322nd Air Division, effective 1 July 1962.

The mission of the exercise was four-fold: (1) to exercise the USAFE war plans and test procedures in support of a concept designed for the exercise; (2) to test the capability and flexibility of the current "in-being" communications system; (3) to defend the Fourth ATAF-CENTAG area of responsibility through execution of the regional defense plan; and (4) to exercise command and control at each level of command.

Phases

at 1535Z hours on 10 April, placed the station out of the exercise play until 0530Z hours on 11 April.

Pre-Exercise Warm-up

MAX EFFORT

The purposes of MAX EFFORT were as follows:

- a. To develop base capability to cope with disaster situations while performing their assigned mission.
- b. To produce effects on launch capability that an actual situation would create.
- c. To use the Line 1000 Reporting System to reflect the launch capability of a particular base.

The Line 1000 reporting system operated on a limited factor concept whereby the only items reported by the base to higher headquarters were items that would prevent the base from carrying out its primary mission.

Evaluation

After the receipt of unit final reports and staff recommendations this headquarters on 25 May 1962 issued the final report on GRAND SLAM I to Fourth ATAF, with information copies to Headquarters USAF and headquarters staff agencies. This report outlined command participation and included appropriate recommendations for conduct of future exercises.

A serious defect in the exercise was that the conventional and nuclear capabilities of Seventeenth Air Force units was not exploited fully. Aircraft, crews and weapons were available for conduct of additional sorties but were not tasked. Delay until the declaration of R-Hour before assigning targets to nuclear aircraft that were maintaining a quick action alert (QAA) posture left these aircraft as prime targets for "enemy" air efforts. In the event of actual war they would not survive. This situation was totally unrealistic.

Also, it was unrealistic for the aggressor force to survive the NATO nuclear assault and retain the capability to retaliate with vigor. Logistic procedures and capability were not tested to the extent desired. CENTAF did not follow one method consistently in handling strike releases; a result was that duplicate strikes were laid on for the same target.

As in previous exercises there were the usual late changes in directives. USAFE recommended that Fourth ATAF develop a standard exercise directive for use in all NATO-sponsored exercises. This would eliminate the need for last-minute changes and reduce the large amount of effort required of subordinate headquarters in planning and carrying out this type of exercise. Also, no change in exercise procedures and concepts ought to be introduced during the 14 days preceding the start of an exercise.

The late receipt of frag orders during the exercise resulted in confusion and failure to accomplish reconnaissance missions. Intelligence information provided during the play was not adequate. In several respects information was not available readily. This was true in the land situation and in communications between the COC and United Kingdom bases.

On the other hand, some improvements had been made. It was noted that base personnel were best qualified to develop base incident plans. Also, the assumption by base control cells of a greater portion of responsibility for control than in previous exercises resulted in effective accomplishment. Through use of a low level broadcast control system Seventeenth Air Force aircraft were controlled effectively.

The automatic attack program for conventional offensive aircraft was conducted in an excellent manner. In ground support operations the procedure by which pilots obtained all ground support results from the FAC was an improvement over the procedure in previous exercises. The Seventeenth Air Force Combat Support Cell took a considerable load from the Fourth ATAF COC and worked well.

The play of communications outages was successful in that re-routing and recovery capabilities were practiced. The single side-band and high frequency equipment was of great value to the tactical units. Except during the pre-exercise period, USAFE communications in general were adequate.

B. SECOND HALF 1962

EXERCISE FALLEX 62

1. INTRODUCTION

and naval forces assigned to or earmarked for NATO's SACEUR.

In coordination with and in support of FALLEX 62 there was played HIGH HEELS II, a world-wide CFI sponsored by the Chiefs of Staff. In this exercise the general war plans of unified and specified commands were played.

2. THE SEVENTEENTH AIR FORCE ROLE

As a NATO-committed organization the Seventeenth Air Force's mission was to support these exercises in accordance with the

command's war plans as adapted to Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force and USAFE exercise directives. The Seventeenth Air Force war plans were the Emergency Defense Plan (EDP), Nuclear Strike Plan (NSP) and Combat Alert Plan (CAP).

The movement of forces and equipment were to be simulated for the exercise of war plans.³⁰ Exercise employment of forces was permitted but was not allowed to interfere with the conduct or objectives of the exercise. At their own discretion wing commanders were permitted to fly their forces. However, the flying which occurred was too insignificant for report. This was due to the extensive on-base play and the weather criteria imposed upon participation.

All Seventeenth Air Force subordinate units were included in the exercise task organizations. They executed their assigned tasks as set forth in war plans and at the appropriate stages of alert within the exercise framework. Emphasis was placed upon procedures and command functions of Seventeenth Air Forces assigned to SACEUR and of those USAF units available to support this command's tasks and missions. The Central European and United Kingdom Communications Regions of the USAF Communications Service were included in these USAF units available. When directed by the Commander-in-Chief of USAFE (CINCUSAFE) Seventeenth Air Forces assigned to SACEUR were transferred to the operational control of Fourth ATAF; at the termination of the exercise they were returned to the operational control of the Commander of the Seventeenth Air Force.

During the period 6 - 19 September actions were suspended during non-duty hours and weekends. The period 20 - 28 September was primarily

a CPI. All headquarters and control staffs for this phase of
FALLEX 62 were to be manned and at their wartime locations by 200001
hours September 1962.

Control Agencies

Specialists in the fields of logistics, civil affairs, intelligence, counter-intelligence and communications were included in the Fourth ATAF Centralized Control Cell.³⁵ The Seventeenth Air Force Distaff contained representatives from strike, reconnaissance and air defense.

In the logistics area FALLEI 62 was primarily a procedural exercise to test existing procedures required to implement and support actual war plans. In the event of loss and damage due to blast, fall-out and chemical and biological warfare attacks logistical assistance was requested through the Seventeenth Air Force combat staff through the Line 1000 report system and from the nearest base of the command in accordance with base support procedures.

All Seventeenth Air Force medical units participated actively in FALLIX 62. All tactical medical units deployed to field operating sites and exercised transportable 36-bed infirmaries. Functional operational units included surgery, X-ray, laboratory, pharmacy, dental, outpatient, medical and surgical wards and food services.³⁶

Warmup Exercises

FOOTNOTES

MANEUVERS AND EXERCISES

1. Hist USAFE, Jul-Dec 61, pp. 224,225. SECRET/NOFORN.
2. Ibid, Execution and Objectives.
3. WII, 2 Jan 62, Item 4, LONG THRUST IIA. SECRET.
4. WII, 8 Jan 62, Item 1, LONG THRUST IIA. SECRET.
5. Stars and Stripes (European ed.), 14 Jan 62.
6. Stars and Stripes (European ed.), 13 Jan 62. And Hq USAFE Hist Div, Case File 1962, subj: Exercise LONG THRUST II.
7. Stars and Stripes (European ed.), 19 and 21 Jan 62.
8. Stars and Stripes (European ed.), 14 Jan 62.
9. WII, 19 Feb 62, Item 6, LONG THRUST IIA.
10. Ltr 17AF (O-PP3) to USAFE (OPLC), 27 Feb 62, LONG THRUST IIA "Initial Report."
11. Ibid.
12. WII, 22 Jan 62, Item 4, LONG THRUST IIA. CONFIDENTIAL.
13. 17AF Supplement to 4 ATAF Ops Order 102/62/M, 3 Jan 62, Exercise LONG THRUST. CONFIDENTIAL.
14. Msg O-03 29-C 17AF to 152 Tao Con Gp and 86 AD, 8 Jan 62. CONFIDENTIAL.
15. 17AF Supplement, LONG THRUST IIA, p. 2.
16. Msg O-PP3 14 17AF to 20, 48, 49 and 81 Tao Ftr Wgs and 47 Bomb Wg, 15 Jan 62. CONFIDENTIAL.
17. Ltr 17AF (O-PP3) to USAFE(OPLC), 27 Feb 62, LONG THRUST IIA "Initial Report," p. 4 table; Hist USAFE, Jan-Jun 62, Vol III, Exhibit II-1, History Offense Operations in DCS Operations. SECRET/NOFORN.
18. Ibid.

19. Msg O-PP3 242, 17AF, 27 Apr 62, to 38 Tac Msl Wg, 7020 ABWg, 31 Wea Sq, 7310 ABWg. SECRET.
20. Msg O-PP3 298 17AF, 28 May 62, to USAFE, Exhibit II-2.
21. Hq USAREUR Ops Plan, 11 Jun 62, Exercise LONG THRUST.
22. USAFE OPLAN 152-62, 15 Jun 62, LONG THRUST.
23. Msg O-PP3-9 Comdr 17AF, 10 Jan 62, to 86 AD, 10 Tac Rec Wg and 26 others, Exhibit II-3. SECRET.
24. Hq 17AF Directive, 9 Mar 62, Exercise GRAND SLAM I, Annex A, p.4, and Appendix I, Conventional Operations. SECRET.
25. Ibid, Annex A and Appendix I, p. 2. SECRET; Hist 20 TFW, Jan-Jun 62, p. 19. SECRET.
26. Msg O-PP3 201 17AF, 4 Apr 62, to 10 Tac Rec Wg and 15 others, Directing Staff Warm-up. SECRET; WII, 9 Apr 62, Item 10, GRAND SLAM I. SECRET.
27. Hist USAFE, Jan-Jun 62, DCS/Ops, Dir Plans & Programs, Vol III, pp. 5,6. SECRET/NOFORN.
28. WII, 30 Apr 62, Item 4, GRAND SLAM Critique; Ltr 17AF (O-PP3), 25 May 62, to distribution, Post Exercise Narrative Report - GRAND SLAM I, Exhibit II-8, and attached Final Report. SECRET.
29. Hq 17AF Exercise Directive FALLEX 62/HIGH HEELS II, 24 Aug 62, pp. 2,3. SECRET.
30. Intv 28 Jan 63, LtCol Philip L. Long, Hq 17AF, DCS/Ops, Dir Plans and Operations, Contingency Plans (-PP3).
31. Hq 17AF Exercise Directive, pp. 3-7, cited fn 29. SECRET.
32. Ibid, Annex E, Command, p. 2.
33. Ibid, pp. 3,4.
34. Ibid, Appendix 4 to Annex A.
35. Hq 17AF Exercise Directive, p. 6 and Appendix 1 to Annex E, Personnel Augmentation.
36. Ibid, Annex Q, Engineering.